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NOTICES

Disclaimers
The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents.
Citation of manufacturer's or trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use thereof.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE⎯Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. Do not return it to the originator. (2) . For the purposes of the GMLRS IOT, the flight phase focused on the effectiveness of the GMLRS against threat representative targets, the reliability of the GMLRS, and the demonstrated safety of the GMLRS submunitions. The IOT was a comprehensive test of the operational Effectiveness, suitability and survivability of GMLRS. The U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) supported the test effort and collected data to assess human factors issues during IOT mission performance.
Purpose
The primary purpose of this ARL effort was to record Soldier comments, impressions, and recommendations for improving the GMLRS rocket in areas related to the design of the rocket itself. Their responses also offered insights as to the training required to handle, maintain, and employ the GMLRS rocket with the HIMARS and its associated support vehicles. The Soldiers were asked to strictly limit their comments and recommendations based upon their individual experiences in the IOT.
Method
Requirements
ARL's Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED) manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT) support for the GMLRS IOT was formalized immediately before the February 2004 combined HIMARS and GMLRS Operational Test Working Group 3 met. The scope of the MANPRINT evaluation was defined in the event design plan published by Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) as an associated issue under the critical operational issue 2: Suitability. Labeled a "MANPRINT Assessment," (1, figure 2-1 , page 2-1) in actuality, the assessment was smaller in scope and focused on obtaining Soldier comments that could be used in an IOT human factors evaluation (HFE). Whereas the primary purpose of a MANPRINT assessment is to address unresolved critical MANPRINT issues (in all seven MANPRINT domains) to the Milestone Decision Authority, the HFE conducted in this IOT supported the ATEC evaluation of the GMLRS and highlighted the operational suitability of the Soldier-system interface in an operational setting. Such an evaluation provides information to the tester as to whether Soldier-test participants can successfully operate the system being evaluated in accordance with required standards, after having been trained to meet those standards.
General Procedures
All test personnel received formal training in their military occupational specialty (MOS)-related tasks. Individual training progressed to collective training in accordance with the outline test plan (OTP) HIMARS initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E), dated 30 August 2004 and the OTP, GMLRS IOT&E, dated 3 August 2004. On 7 September 2004, an operational test readiness statement for the combined HIMARS and GMLRS IOT&E was issued by the U.S. Army Field Artillery School that all test player personnel could satisfactorily perform individual and collective tasks to meet the standard. No other formal training and evaluation were administered to the Soldiers employing the HIMARS and GMLRS for the purposes of the test. However, the Soldier surveys contained training-related questions in which the respondents were asked to assess the level of training they felt they had achieved as a result of the IOT.
A pilot test was conducted immediately after individual and collective training. The pilot test was followed by a week of maintenance training in preparation for the record test ground phase of the IOT. The record test ground phase was conducted from 20 to 30 September 2004. Data collection throughout the period from the pilot test through the completion of the record test ground phase was performed with manual and automated methods. Manual methods included test incident reports, questionnaires designed to obtain feedback from Soldiers who participated in the test, and data collection forms completed by data collectors who were part of the Fort Sill Fire Support Test Directorate (FSTD). Automated methods included Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) print-outs and instrumentation installed on the launchers and fire direction equipment (3, paragraph 4.8.3.5) .
The Fort Sill Field Element of ARL's HRED and the Fort Sill FSTD jointly developed the primary questionnaire instruments designed to obtain feedback from Soldiers who were the primary constituents in the test. These Soldiers were MOS 13M (MLRS Crewman), MOS 27M (MLRS Repairman), MOS 13P (Fire Direction Specialist), and MOS 63 series (Vehicle Maintenance) personnel. The questionnaires were administered on 4 October 2004 and at the culmination of the IOT flight phase at WSMR. In the 4 October 2004 survey session at Fort Sill, all Soldier participants (MOS 13M, 13P, 27M, and 63 series) were administered their respective questionnaires. At the culmination of the IOT flight phase, only selected 13M, 13P, and 27M Soldiers who deployed to WSMR to participate in the IOT flight phase were again administered the same questionnaires; they were asked to answer only those questions that were applicable. The answers obtained from the flight phase were combined with those from the ground phase but were not used to compare the Soldier's experiences between the ground and flight phases.
Questionnaires
Three of the four survey instruments that were developed for the combined HIMARS and GMLRS IOT provided Soldiers with the opportunity to address GMLRS-related issues. These instruments were the MOS 13M, MOS 13P, and MOS 27M Soldier questionnaires. The fourth survey instrument was the MOS 63 series Soldier questionnaire and it was only applicable to the HIMARS portion of the combined IOT. Focused Feedback on GMLRS Operations. The MOS 13M survey was the most extensive of the four surveys. It required all 13M Soldiers to initially rate their levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with various characteristics and design features of both the HIMARS launcher and the RSV/T. They were asked to use the Likert scale described in table 1. Of the 31 questions asked in Part I, only Question 31 was applicable to the scope of the GMLRS IOT. This is discussed further in section 4 of this report, which addresses survey results. For the purposes of the GMLRS IOT, neither Part II nor Part III was applicable since both were vehicle related 1 . Instead, Part IV presented seven open-ended GMLRS-related questions to the Soldiers. Part IV specifically focused on training, the use of the launcher fire control system (LFCS) to process GMLRS missions, and general handling of the GMLRS launch pod container (LPC). MOS 13M Soldier comments and responses are summarized in appendix A, with the resultant findings, based on an analysis of these responses, presented in section 4 of this report.
The MOS 13P Soldier questionnaire presented seven open-ended questions in which fire direction Soldiers from platoon to battalion level could provide feedback and comments on processing fire missions for the XM30 GMLRS based on their experiences in the IOT. MOS 13P Soldiers' comments and responses are summarized in appendix B, with the resultant findings, based on an analysis of these responses, presented in section 4 of this report.
The MOS 27M Soldier questionnaire consisted of two parts with a number of open-ended questions for each. In Part I, MOS 27M Soldiers were presented with eight questions and were asked to provide feedback and comments about maintaining and repairing the HIMARS launcher system. For the purposes of the GMLRS IOT, Part I was not applicable. 2 In Part II, Soldiers were presented with five questions and were asked to provide feedback and comments on performing troubleshooting and maintenance-related tasks on the XM30 guided MLRS rocket. The MOS 27M Soldier questionnaire was administered at Fort Sill after the ground phase of the IOT culminated and again at WSMR after the IOT flight phase culminated. Player comments and responses are summarized in appendix C, with the resultant findings, based on an analysis of these responses, presented in section 4 of this report.
Results
All the results discussed are based on a subjective analysis of the Soldiers' responses to the surveys they were given. The purpose of the analysis was to glean human factors insights and issues as well as recommendations for improving the XM30 GMLRS rocket.
MOS 13M Survey Results
MOS 13M training adequately prepared HIMARS crews to handle, upload, and operationally employ the GMLRS rocket. Most HIMARS crews did not experience problems or challenges when using the LFCS to process GMLRS fire missions or communicate the fire mission with AFATDS.
In Part I (satisfaction/dissatisfaction), Question 31 asked MOS 13M Soldiers how satisfied or dissatisfied they were that the MLRS MFOM weapons simulator (MWS) helps to adequately train the HIMARS crew to perform essential tasks. This question was applicable to the GMLRS IOT because the MWS was upgraded to the MWSA1 for the IOT and used to represent the MFOM (including GMLRS) during dry-fire missions and during all phases of the test program when using tactical munitions was not practical (1, para 2.7.5). Although not specifically worded to address GMLRS, the question nevertheless implies that the MWS was intended to be used in the IOT to simulate the complete MFOM, which included the new GMLRS, and as such, gave opportunity for the player participants to register dissatisfaction if the complete MFOM was not simulated, thereby hampering training. A total of 30 player participants provided answers, of which, six were not applicable (N/A) answers. Of the remaining 24 respondents, only five indicated they were dissatisfied that the MFOM MWS helps to adequately train the HIMARS crew to perform essential tasks. Two of the five were dedicated HIMARS operators and the remaining three were dedicated RSV/T drivers. All support personnel respondents (six) were satisfied with the MWS.
In Part IV (GMLRS Operations), 92% of HIMARS crew members indicated that the training they received prepared them to properly upload a GMLRS LPC onto a HIMARS launcher and to properly execute a GMLRS fire mission. Of the HIMARS crew members, 83% indicated that they did not experience any problems or challenges using the LFCS to process GMLRS fire missions or communicate the fire mission with the AFATDS. The problems addressed by two HIMARS crew members (17%) were (a) not being able to reload software if GMLRS was the last mission selected and (b) the FCS giving a false indication of a dud in one of the launcher tubes when there were six functioning rockets. The first issue cannot be assessed to determine if there was an adverse operational impact since no additional information was provided. In the second issue, the crew chief took action to cancel the mission it was in, stowed the launcher loader module (LLM), and conducted a short-no-voltage test (SNVT). During the mission, another dud was registered in tube 6, but all six rockets safely fired during the missions. It was not until after the subsequent reload that the indication of a dud disappeared from the FCS. No other crew identified these issues and both were apparently not significant to have caused failures to complete fire missions. The RSV/T crews generally did not make entries regarding GMLRS training or the use of the LFCS to process GMLRS fire missions. The remainder of the Soldiers' comments did not highlight significant issues regarding the need to improve software interoperability between the HIMARS FCS and AFATDS for processing GMLRS fire missions. Finally, most respondents indicated that the handling and loading of GMLRS LPCs as well as processing GMLRS fire missions were accomplished without work-around procedures.
MOS 13P (Fire Direction Specialist) Soldier Survey
No significant issues were uncovered with the MOS 13P Soldier survey which pointed to software interoperability problems between the AFATDS and the HIMARS LFCS. Such interoperability problems would have resulted in an inability to successfully fire the GMLRS with the HIMARS launcher.
Questions 1 through 3 focused on the training the Soldiers received for GMLRS and what if anything could be done to improve training. In question 1, 85% responded that they were required to receive GMLRS-specific 13P training before the test. These personnel were the primary fire direction personnel in the platoon, battery, and battalion operations centers whose IOT duties required them to regularly process GMLRS missions in some manner. All 20 13P Soldiers responded to question 2 indicating they all had received training that helped them for the GMLRS IOT. Of these, 90% of the Soldiers felt that the training they received prepared them to properly execute a GMLRS mission. The 10% (two Soldiers) who indicated that the IOT training had not prepared them to properly execute a GMLRS mission were not the same personnel who had indicated in question 1 that they were not required to receive GMLRS specific 13P training before the test. Although unconfirmed, the differences in who provided negative responses for questions 1 and 2 may have resulted from a perception that question 2 included both the formal training received before the test and any informal training the Soldiers felt they received during the test. It is a well-known fact that Army training is an ongoing endeavor that is not strictly limited to the classroom. Finally, in question 3, 20 comments were made about what can be done to make training better. Only four commented that training was sufficient and need not be improved. Eight comments seemed to corroborate Soldier perceptions that everything that occurred in the IOT was "training". Generally, these comments suggested eliminating the simulations, adding more personnel, live firing more GMLRS rockets, and making the field exercise a continuous week-long event. The few recommendations made to improve classroom instruction suggested that 13P personnel did not need 13M-related instruction, that the instructors should be knowledgeable about the subject at hand, and that the trainers should spend a little more time explaining the equipment.
Questions 4 through 7 attempted to gain feedback about the ease of use of and interoperability between the AFATDS and the HIMARS fire control system for processing GMLRS fire missions. In question 4, 35% of respondents (seven) indicated that they experienced problems or challenges when using the AFATDS to process GMLRS fire missions or communicate the fire mission with the HIMARS FCS. Five of these seven identified that their problems stemmed from receiving incomplete fire mission data for JEG 3 missions and the AFATDS communications and control unit (CCU) transmitting geometries to the launchers for no apparent reason. For the incomplete JEG mission data, all respondents indicated that they made manual entries to fill all required data fields, recalculating the mission and returning it to the launchers. None of these problems or the techniques employed by the operators could be associated with failed JEG mission time lines. In question 5, most Soldiers did not recommend software interoperability improvements based on their IOT experiences in processing GMLRS missions. For question 6, 30% of the Soldiers indicated that work-around procedures were required to successfully process a GMLRS fire mission. All the work-around procedures were again described as the manual input of fire mission data for JGEG missions that were received with incomplete information. All other respondents to question 6 indicated that they did not employ any work-around procedures to successfully execute GMLRS fire missions. Finally, in question 7, the Soldiers were asked to provide any additional comments or concerns they had regarding AFATDS software and training for processing a GMLRS fire mission, which had not already been mentioned. Of the 14 comments recorded, only four vaguely addressed AFATDS software and training, and none of these were viewed as stoppers for GMLRS mission processing.
MOS 27M Survey (Part II Only) Results
IOT training adequately prepared the MOS 27M Soldiers to conduct diagnostic tests on the GMLRS.
In Part II (GMLRS Maintenance) all the MOS 27M Soldiers indicated that the training they received prepared them to properly conduct diagnostic tests on the GMLRS LPC with the MFOM common test device (MCTD). They did not recommend changing anything to make the operations/maintenance of the MCTD better. Two of the Soldiers indicated that maintenance on the GMLRS could be made better by updating the GMLRS interactive electronic training manual and software. Finally, recommendations to improve training on the GMLRS LPC and MCTD highlighted the need to allot more time to train and focus the training on all the testing devices instead of making it a broad discussion.
Conclusions
The evaluation of the GMLRS IOT survey data did not reveal any significant human factors issues. Therefore, it can be concluded that the state of human factors engineering for the XM30 GMLRS enables successful handling and employment by trained HIMARS crews and support personnel.
Recommendations
Recommend that the ATEC accept and include the findings and conclusions presented in this report into the system evaluation report for the XM30 GMLRS rocket.
Appendix A. MOS 13M Survey Data Demographics
A total of 30 Soldiers answered the MOS 13M questionnaire. Of the total, 24 personnel were evenly split (12 each) as crews for the RSV/T and crews for the HIMARS launchers. The remaining six were additional support platoon personnel with the following duty positions: Ammunition Section Chief, Reconnaissance Driver/Backup HIMARS Driver, Admin Logistics Operations Center/Battery Operations Center (ALOC/BOC) Specialist, Firing Platoon Leader, Reconnaissance Sergeant and Ammunition Platoon Sergeant. Of the total population, 18 (60%) were enlisted Soldiers (E3s and E4s), 11 (37%) were noncommissioned officers (NCOs) (E5 through E7), and one (3%) was a commissioned officer (O2).
The lowest time in service (TIS) recorded by the 24 MOS 13M soldiers who comprised the HIMARS and RSV/T crews, was 12 months, while their highest TIS was 182 months (15 yrs, 2 months). The lowest and highest times in MOS (TIMOS) for this segment of the population were also 12 months and 182 months, respectively.
The average and median months of TIS and TIMOS for the RSV crews and the HIMARS crews are shown in the following tables. When my gunner loaded the weapons after a reload we had six rounds. When he hit launcher lay we had a dud. I told him to cancel the mission and stow. I conducted another SNVT and the FCS registered the round. I had a dud in tube 6 but tube 6 fired. After I fired the last round and conducted a reload the dud on tube 6 went away. Possible software problem. Q5: In your opinion, is there anything that should be done to improve the software interoperability between the HIMARS FCS and AFATDS for GMLRS fire mission processing? (11 total responses) None/No: 5 Responses No, it seemed to be fine Make free text messages able to be sent and received from HIMARS instead of just being able to receive. Yes but I have no input to improve the system. Yes, the software came a long way from when we first started the IOT and many improvements were made. They need to continue on this.
EOM commands need to be updated after every fire mission. Not that I am aware of. The problems we had were because of LIDAS (launcher instrumentation data acquisition system). The system works well. Q6: Were there any work-around procedures that you had to use in order to: a. Successfully process a GMLRS fire mission?
YES: 2 Responses NO: 10 Responses b. Successfully handle and load GMLRS LPC's?
YES: 1 Response NO: 11 Responses c. If you answered yes to either or both 6a and 6b, please describe the work-around procedure(s), when you had to use these procedures, and (if possible) how GMLRS operations were affected. Two bays with right bay having rockets. Two JEG uploaded after reload.
(@WSMR) After uploading we had six rockets on board. Once we pressed launcher lay, rocket 1 became a dud and we could only fire five rounds on a six-round mission. We had to stow the LLM, disconnect the cables, re-hook up the cables and do a manual reload. After the LLM was [up] rocket 1 came up good, but rocket 6 came up as a dud. Rocket 6 was an empty bay from firing it on the first mission. This is my personal work-around: When a dud occurs simply complete the fire mission, stow, conduct a reload and continue the mission.
Q7: Please provide any additional comments or concerns (if any) that you have regarding the training and employment of the GMLRS rocket, which have not already been mentioned (four total responses).
Good system worked every time Training would have been better if there were more live GMLRS fire missions. Having been to war, we would [like] to see ammo that doesn't take so long [to] process. Speed is the key to our success. More training on the load angle of pod
Appendix B. MOS 13P Survey Data Demographics
A total of 20 Soldiers answered the MOS 13P questionnaire. They provided the critical fire direction functions from the platoon operations center, the BOC, and the battalion operations center. Of the total population, nine (45%) were enlisted Soldiers (E2s and E4s), nine (45%) were NCOs (E5 through E7), and two (10%) were commissioned officers (O2).
The lowest TIS recorded by the 18 MOS 13P Soldiers (less the commissioned officers) was 9 months, while the highest recorded TIS was 232 months (19 yrs, 4 months). The lowest and highest recorded TIMOS were 6 months and 140 months (11 years, 8 months).
Survey Responses
In this appendix, focused feedback by MOS 13P Soldiers who received GMLRS training and supported the IOT is presented. (The responses are presented as written by the Soldiers.)
Questions and Answers Q1: Were you required to receive GMLRS specific 13P training prior to this test? Yes: 17 Responses No: 3 Responses If not, why not? As far as it works on the fire direction center (FDC) side of the house -GMLRS is no different than the actual A270 MLRS. It's a good thing, because it allows us to cross train from HIMARS to launchers. I'm not a 13M. I process missions. It doesn't matter what type of munition we fire. My job is to send it to the launchers. I was not yet assigned to the unit. However, once assigned I received on-the-job training. The GMLRS munitions were discussed so that I would understand how it works. I do not know if it was required knowledge. Gave a better understanding of what we were getting into (familiarization) of the HIMARS launcher and its equipment. BN FDC section with Alpha Battery was tasked out for about two weeks learning the fire direction side of the HIMARS, which was really interesting. Knowing that the HIMARS can fire any type of munitions and are really quicker on reloads as well get to the FP faster than the MLRS launchers. Not really. Most of the material covered in class we already knew from our AIT (advanced individual training). This class doesn't cover anything new to us. No, I did not process one fire mission during the 96-hr IOT. Both of them! Fire missions were sent to FDC with Guided munitions. I became familiar with the nomenclature and the rest of the fire mission was handled as they normally are. Because the training received gave us a better understanding of what we were going to be working with and at the same time how much change there was in our part 13P/AFATDS. That's a big "Roger". Yes because knowing how the AFATDS works with the HIMARS was pretty easy, once you got comms with them. One thing that we as 13P's had to get use to was the HIMARS only having one pod and not two so we couldn't shoot as fast as we normally do. Yes, the instructors broke everything down easily to understand. Any questions I did have, they were around to answer them. Yes, I have been processing missions for 36+ months now. This is just another type of munition to be fired. I feel better, however, after having some training with M30's. Yes! Processing the GMLRS mission is the same as any other missile/rocket type mission.
Yes, Fired like any other mission. Yes, plus I already knew what they taught. Yes, it is pretty simple. Just change the munitions on AFATDS.
Yes the training that we received did help with the mission and made it easy to understand.
Q3: What can be done to make training better?
I felt like the training I received was sufficient for the test. I don't feel there is anything to make it better. Better briefings at the beginning of the training exercise to better understand the set of events we are supposed to encounter. Same as having a better, set training schedule. Also a better plan can be worked out to allow a better sleep plan for the HIMARS crews.
Training for the fire direction portion could be maintained. As for the actual GMLRS crew members, better and faster ways to troubleshoot problems. One problem that I thought could be changed was take all the simulators out the picture and concentrate only on the subject at hand which was the HIMARS performing. There was no reason to be running 24-hour ops. Take away the simulations and add real personnel.
Have a separate block of instructions for the 13P's. A lot of briefings we had were directed at the 13M's. More time in IOT with the HIMARS with live rounds. Scenario base training, with battle damage assessments. The training was very straightforward, fire mission processing easy. For skill level 1, emphasize the fact that a GMLRS round effects are interchangeable with AFATDS similar to the way a Block 1 and Block 1A are. The difference for AFATDS is range. Also emphasize that although with GMLRS MET is still important, it is nowhere near as necessary as long as the round is not jammed. Possibly some more hands-on training with the AFATDS and actual launcher to ensure that the process is understood and how it works properly. Maybe a little more hands-on of actually processing the missions. Fire more live rockets, to include GMLRS Professors who actually know about the subject at hand. The instructors should be hand picked straight out of either the schoolhouse or a line battery. It needs to be someone that's been doing the job recently, not someone that hasn't been at the box for quite a bit Well instead of the days when we came in at 3 in the morning and left at 7 just make it a week in the field. The trainers should take more time to explain the equipment. Excellent training Simulation training using the mission driver before going to the field. Myself, I thought the training we received was helpful but maybe at first we should make the classes a little longer because at first it was a little hard to understand, but after a week, I did start to pick up on it with the time I had. Include the Support platoon FDC (fire direction center) into the equation. Don't waste the resources. Sometimes when a fire mission was received, the mission came up in my box with no munitions, so I had to go to the attack options tab and go through order to fire to give the proper munitions. This had also occurred with various other munitions, which would lead me to believe that was an AFATDS issue, not a munitions issue. One thing that I could say was troubleshooting the radio at one time. The Btry would receive the mission without rounds and would have to insert rounds in the mission. On occasion a launcher would not be a viable attack option and the status we seen was correct. So we would send it down using the send selected button from the Attack Options Tab. Launcher would process mission correctly but would have to hold a mission in our IP where the radio buttons turned black until mission was completed, or launcher would receive a EOM (end of mission)/denied fire mission. Refer to question 4's answer on that. Refer to Q4. IOT seemed to have went perfectly in regards to the actual HIMARS launchers. None whatsoever. No, Not at all to my knowledge. Q7: Please provide any additional comments or concerns (if any) that you have regarding AFATDS software and training for processing a GMLRS fire mission, which have not already been mentioned. No further comments at this time. I have no additional comments. AFATDS software was all fine except when dealing with the simulators, when we would come across commo problems. Job purpose, Since the 13P had more involvement with fire mission processing, Soldiers who excelled should have been the ones to be recognized instead of the personal [sic] who just drove around (data collectors) [awards/coins] None. None at this time. I think training and learning how HIMARS work was pretty interesting and not that difficult to adapt to. I thought the test went on very smoothly. There are some bugs to be worked out of the launcher but other than that the launcher seems to be pretty reliable. Like everything else in life, there will be glitches. Just keep researching and testing these systems. I'm convinced everything will be fine. "STEEL" The test ran very smooth and in a timely manner.
We spent 3 months completely dedicated to this HIMARS test. Not consecutive but 3 months. We have Soldiers who did not receive an award or a coin for their time, something to look back on and say they were a part of the initial testing for an military hardware/software equipment. Tell me, what does a section chief say to a Soldier who receives nothing but works just as hard as anyone else on the testing? I do believe for the most part AFATDS in this version works well with GMLRS and it will improve with the next version of AFATDS As earlier stated, I think there should be more hands on training so that not only 13P's but 13M's also have time to experience the full process of shooting a GMLRS mission. The AFATDS can send digital messages to the launchers, but it can't receive them back. I feel that the AFATDS should be able to receive those messages. When receiving MET, the AFATDS would sometime shut down. What is up? Safety data calculator -sometimes software didn't work -we had to input MET data -but after then no problem. No not any. I think that this new GMLRS is pretty good but could be better. If you include a Support PLT FDC in an IOT then use them for just that.
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